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This paper is an attempt to explain the 
Kenyan authorities' inhumane treat- 
ment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali 
refugees in terms of long-standing 
conflicts between Kenya and Somalia, 
and the Kenyan authorities' reaction to 
what they perceived as a "credible 
threat" from the North-Eastern Rovince. 
This long history of conflict and tension 
has created a distorted and hostile image 
of the Somalis as "enemies" of the 
Kenyan state. The image, real or 
imaginary, has continued to influence 
the Kenyan authorities' behaviour 
towards the Somalis, which has led to 
gross violations of human rights.' This, 
however, is not an exhaustive expla- 
nation for the treatment of the two 
groups. Other variables, not directly 
examined here include the nature of the 
postcolonial state, the broader question 
of political legitimacy, the nature of the 
ruling class and the role of violence as a 
response to state repression. 
In order to understand the devel- 
opment of this image andits implications 
for Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees 
in Kenya, it is .imperative to highlight 
some of the critical elements of the 
conflicts between the Kenyan gov- 
ernment and the inhabitants of the 
North-Eastern Rovince of Kenya (which 
is the major part of what was formerly 
the Northern Frontier District), and 
between the Kenyan government and 
the government of Somalia. The conflict 
has its origins in the colonial era. At the 
turn of the century, Britain extended her 
control over this semiarid area. One of 
the foremost scholars on the region, A.A. 
Castagno, cites three reasons for this 
action: 1) to "provide a buffer between 
Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia on the 
one side, and the East African railway 
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andthe white settlersin the highlands on 
the other"; 2) to deter the Ethiopian 
imperial power from annexing Boran 
and Gabro; and 3) to check "the Somali 
south-westward expansion." 
To effect some of these policies and 
minimize ethnic and clan conflicts, 
administrative borders were redrawn, 
and in 1909 Somalis were not allowed 
beyond the Somali-Galla line. However, 
these policies caused Somaliresistance to 
British colonialism to es~alate .~ The 
colonial regime responded by declaring 
(through its Outlying District Ordi- 
nance) the Northern Frontier District 
(NF'D) a closed district in 1926. By this 
draconian ordinance, colonial admini- 
strators were given sweeping powers to 
deal with any form of dissent or 
This long history of conflict 
and tension has created a 
distorted and hostile image 
of the Somalis as "enemies" 
of the Kenyan state. 
resistance. This was followed by the 
Special District Ordinance, which 
imposed severe restriction on movement 
to or from the "Special Di~trict."~ With 
this administrative control mechanism, 
Somalis were required to obtain special 
approval or passes to enter other 
provinces. It is clear, therefore, that this 
region did not generally share the same 
colonial experience with the rest of the 
country. To be precise, no serious 
attempt was madeby the colonial regime 
to foster the socio-economic and political 
integration of this area into the rest of the 
country. 
In a relentless attempt to address the 
grievances of the inhabitants of the area 
and revitalize the quest for Somali unity 
in eastern Africa, the Somali Youth 
League (SYL), founded in 1943 in 
Muqdisho, established itselfin the NFD, 
the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and in 
British S ~ m a l i l a n d . ~  However, in 
keeping with the colonial response to the 
development of African nationalism in 
the country, political parties were 
banned in the NFD and the leadership of 
SYL was exiled between 1948 and 1960. 
With the lifting of proscription on 
Somali parties in the area in 1960 and the 
unity between Somali and British 
Somaliland on July 1, 1960 to form the 
Somali Republic, the struggle for self- 
determination intensified in the NF'D. 
The Northern Province People's 
Progressive Party, the Northern 
Province Democratic Party, the People's 
National League, and the National 
Political Movement (Nairobi) were 
organized to champion the cause for the 
NFD's unification with the Somali 
Republic. On the other hand, the 
Northern Province People's National 
Union, the Galla Political Union 
(Nairobi) and the United Ogaden Somali 
Association (Nairobi and Garissa) were 
organized to oppose any union with 
Somali Republic. The former were better 
organized and represented the 
aspirations of the majority of the people 
in the area.5 
The development of modern 
nationalist politics reflected the nature of 
the relations between the larger colonial 
state and the region; furthermore, the 
minority faction in the area that opposed 
unification with Somalia would not only 
become reliable agents of central 
government but would also influence 
administrative policies in their own 
interest and to preserve the status quo. 
As agents of the central government, 
these "collaborators" took upon 
themselves the delicate taskof balancing 
the conflictinginterestsbetweenthestate 
and "their limited constituency." 
Whether or not it was by their own 
volition, this group was promoted as the 
"legitimate" voice of the Somali 
population in the country. 
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During the Lancaster 
Constitutional Conference on 
House 
Kenya's 
independence (~eb rua ry -~~r i l  l962), the 
thorny issue of Somali self- 
determination was raisedby members of 
the NFD and Somali delegations. The 
NFD delegation and the Somali 
government, the latter not officially a 
party to the conference, demanded that 
the NFD question be addressed before 
Kenyan independence. As Castagno 
points out, the NFD and Somali 
government 
insisted that the responsibility for 
settlement was exclusively Britain's and 
that the Somali claims should by no means 
be used by Britain to retard thegrantingof 
Kenyan independence. KANUandKADU 
categorically rejected the secessionist 
proposal, and some members of KANU 
rejoined that the Somalis in the NFD could 
emip te  to Somalia ifthey did not want to 
accept Kenyan administration. KADU's 
membersalleged that thedominant view in 
the NFD favoured a Kenyan regional 
government of the type advocated by 
KADU's leaders. Ethiopia also interposed 
her views. She supported the Kenyan 
leaders and exerted pressure on the British 
gowmment to reject the Somali claim, on 
the ground that acquiescence to Somali 
expansionism would lead to 
"baUianizution" of the area. Thereafter, 
vitriolic exchanges between Somalia and 
Ethiopia and intermittent border clashes 
increased the tension that had long marked 
the Somali-Ethiopian border question .... 
President Aden Abdullah Osman of 
Somalia presented his government's view 
that selfdetermination-when employed 
to unify andenlargean existingstate (as in 
the Somali case)-could not be regarded as 
balkanization.6 
British Colonial Secretary Reginald 
Maudlingresponded to the NFD-Somali 
request by announcing on April 6,1962 
that a commission would be appointed 
to inquire into the state of public opinion 
in the NFD.' In December 1962, the, 
commission's report was conclusive. It 
stated that the majority of the people 
overwhelmingly supported the 
unification of the area with Somalia. 
However, the British government 
acrobatically violated the spirit and the 
findings of the commission; it quickly 
rushed through its own Report of the 
Regional Boundaries Commission. The 
latter report deliberately recommended 
keeping the area within Kenya by simply 
redrawing regional borders? According 
to the Somali government, Britain's 
reversal of policy on this matter was due 
to pressure from Ethiopia against 
reunification and the concession both 
Britain and the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) made over the question 
of white settlers in Kenya? Betrayed by 
Britain's move, the Somali government 
severed diplomatic relations with the 
U.K. on March 18, 1963. Similarly, the 
majority of the inhabitants of the area 
rejected the new border policy and 
intensifiedits armed struggle against the 
colonial regime. To counter the 
heightened insurgency activities in the 
area, a state of emergency was declared 
less explicit was the resolution on 
Somaliland, which stated that "the 
Conference supports the struggle of the 
Somali people for their independence and 
recognizes their right to self- 
determination." The omission of any 
reference to Somaliunityissignificant, but 
the reference to "the right to self- 
determinat ion " was ambiguous, andcould 
be interpreted as implying support for 
secession as an expression of self- 
determination.1° 
The Conference of Independent 
African States in April 1958 was far less 
compromising on the general questions 
of boundary and the reunification of 
national groups divided by colonialism. 
In his summary of the conclusions of the 
conference, President Nkrumah of 
Ghana pointed out that: "Our conference 
To counter the heightened insurgency activities in the area, 
a state of emergency was declared as Kenya obtained 
independence. In short, Kenya's independence did not mean 
freedom from subjugation and harassment in the area. 
as Kenya obtained indeeendence. In 
short, Kenya's independence did not 
mean freedom from subjugation and 
harassment in the area. 
The struggle for the unification of a 
Somali nation was also pursued through 
regional and continental bodies. As a 
matter of fact, Somalia attempted to 
identify its quest for unity through the 
broader quest for pan-Africanism. The 
Somali question, however, received 
mixed support, partly reflecting the 
ideological divide between the radicals 
and the moderate camps among 
nationalist politicians. Saadia Touval 
made the following observation on the 
First Afro-Asian Peoples Solidaiity 
Conference in Cairo, December 1957: 
Most explicit in its endorsement of 
irredentist claims was the resolution on 
Morocco, which stated that "the 
Conference strongly supports the demand 
of Morocco for the return of areas still 
dominated by imperialism in order to 
ensure the unity and complete 
independence of Morocco" .... Somewhat 
came to the conclusion that in the 
interests of that Peace which is so 
essential, we should respect the 
independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of one another ....'Ill 
The All-African Peoples Conference in 
December 1958 sounded another 
conflicting position: 
Be it resolved and it is hereby resolved that 
All-African Peoples Conference that the 
Conference: (a) denounces artificial 
frontiers drawn by imperialist Powers to 
divide the peoples of Africa, particularly 
those which cut across ethnic groups and 
divide people of the same stock; (b) callfor 
the abolition or adjustment of such 
frontiers at an early ddte; (c) calls upon the 
lndependent States of Africa to support 
permanent solution to this problem 
founded upon the true wishes of the 
people ..I2 
However, with the founding of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 
1963, the pendulum finally swung in 
favour of the commitment to territorial 
integrity and respect for existingnational 
borders.13 Thus, contrary to previous 
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rhetoric about the illegitimacy and 
artificiality of colonial borders, the OAU 
showed that African leaders were not 
willing to relinquish their territorial 
possessions. To be sure, the OAU agreed 
that borders of postindependence 
African states were artificial. However, 
at the same time it maintained that the 
survival of the borders is preferable to 
the endless problems that would come 
up once they are critically questioned.14 
This position, which supports the status 
quo, is part of the larger commitment in 
theory tothe principle of noninterference 
in the domestic affairs of other African 
states. In this context, self-determination 
by Somalis in Kenya (North-Eastern 
Province), Ethiopia (Ogaden and 
sections of the Haud and Bale) and 
Djibouti (Afar and Issa regions of the 
former French Somaliland) or by any 
other group is regarded as illegitimate 
and illusionary. 
In postcolonial Kenya, armed 
encounters continued between the 
Kenyan security forces and loosely 
organized Somali groups (referred to as 
Shiftas or "bandits" by the Kenyan 
government). The latter were supported 
directly and indirectly by the Somali 
government. It is reported that between 
1964 and 1967, some 2,000 Somalis were 
massacred by Kenyan security forces.15 
Accordingly, the OAU intervened to 
negotiate what it preferred to consider 
exclusively as.a border dispute between 
Kenya and Somalia. After the OAU 
summit in Kinshasa, a negotiated 
armistice between the two states was 
reached under the chairmanship of 
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in 
October 1967?6 Although the negotiated 
settlement scaled down hostilities 
between the two states and halted the 
four-year revolt in northeastern Kenya, 
the question of Somali unification, which 
was the root of the crisis in the Horn of 
Africa, was left unresolved. According 
to Africa Contemporary Record, the 
settlement also meant different things to 
Kenya and Somalia: 
In a public speech on October20, President 
Kenyatta rejibred to the dispute as "a little 
quarrel" which had been reconciled, and 
announced a relaxation of the 5-year state 
of emergency in the North-Eastern 
Province. In contrast with this, Prime 
Minister ~ ~ a l !  speaking to the majority 
political party in Mogadishu on October 
14, said that his Government's policy was 
to 'stand on one leg readyfor war and with 
the other readyfor peace. l7 
Pressure for the unification was kept 
aliveby various Somali groups in eastern 
Africa. In mid-1974 the United 
Liberation Front of Western Somali 
handed a memorandum to delegates at 
the OAU Summit in Muqdisho, 
demanding the return of the disputed 
territory to Somalia. The response to the 
memorandum by the attorney general of 
Kenya, Charles Njonjo, summarized the 
familiar official view of the government: 
"Kenya could never agree to surrender 
were aggravated by superpower 
involvement and rivalry in the region. To 
be sure, border clashes based on the 
Somali question had been sporadic and 
all previous engagements had been won 
by Ethiopia. After the overthrow of the 
civilian regime of Prime Minister 
Ebrahim Egal in October 1969, the new 
military regime in Somalia moved 
swiftly to reorganize its military 
capability to surpass that of its opponent, 
Ethiopia. In 1974, Somalia signed a 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
with the Soviet Union, which also 
allowed the Soviet Union to build 
extensive military facilities at Berbera on 
the Red Sea coast. The treaty alarmed the 
West-"conservative Arab regimes" 
across the Red Sea and Kenya. The threat 
Tensions between Kenya and Somalia, however, were soon 
ovemhadowed by a more profound conjlkt between Ethiopia 
and Kenya, the Ogaden war. ThH war was a result of both 
internal and external contradictions. 
part of her territory. Kenyans, be they 
Borans or Somalis, who did not support 
Kenya 'should pack their camels and go 
to Somalia'."18 While the message and 
the tone were not new, the implications 
for the inhabitants of the area, however, 
were si&ruficant. Expelling inhabitants 
of the area to Somalia became a strategy 
for resolving the question of self- 
determination. Even peaceful and 
democratic dissent to government 
policies in the area would now be 
lumped with other forms of dissent, so 
that anyone partaking in any form of 
dissent in the region wouldbe seen as an 
"enemy" of the state. This reinforced the 
image of the inhabitants of the area as 
"aliens," whose loyalty to Kenya was 
always questionable. 
Tensions between Kenya and 
Somalia, however, were soon over- 
shadowed by a more profound conflict 
between Ethiopia and Kenya, the 
Ogaden war. This war was a result of 
both internal and external contra- 
dictions. Localconflicts arising from long 
and uncompromising territorial 
disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia 
this treaty created was aptly 
summarized by the U.S.: "the strategic 
Gulf to Cape route had now fallen under 
the Soviet threat."19 
Ethiopia, which had granted the 
United States facilities at the Kagnew 
Base outside Asmara and had benefited 
from enormous U.S. military assistance 
since the 1950s, faced a serious socio- 
politicalcrisis followingthe October 1974 
military coup 1 revol~t ion.~ Specifically, 
the struggles between the Ethiopian left 
and the Dergue from 1975 to 1978 led to a 
reign of terror in the country. The crisis in 
Ethiopia, therefore, provided the regime 
in Somalia with a somewhat false 
opportunity to attempt a military 
solution to the Somali question by 
annexing the OgadenZ1 
As it is now well known, the 
superpowers dramatically changed 
client states-the U.S. backed Somalia 
and the Soviet Union backed Ethiopia. 
With one of the largest armament airlifts 
in contemporary African history, the 
Soviet Union and Cuba made it possible 
for Ethiopian troops to route the 
Somalian military in the Ogaden in 
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1978." When the war ended in July 1979, 
President Moi of Kenya visited Ethiopia 
and, in turn, President Mengistu of 
Ethiopiavisited KenyainDecember 1980 
in a move to strengthen the defence 
cooperation between the two states. The 
fact that the Kenyan government was at 
that time promoting a fervent anti- 
Mar>cist, anticommunist ideology, while 
the Ethiopian government was using 
Marxist dogma to purge government 
bureaucrats and opponents who were 
branded as "capitalist roaders," did not 
appear to deter the two governments 
from strengthening relations. In fact, 
their mutual opposition to the Somali 
government's territorial claims and to 
Somali nationalism within their 
respective territories were clearly major 
points of agreement around which forms 
of cooperation could be worked out. This 
should not come as much of a surprise, 
however, for anti-Marxist dogma in 
Kenya and anticapitalist dogma in 
Ethiopia were used respectively as 
ideological weapons for silencing or 
bludgeoning political opposition. One 
regime might find the otheis political 
program unpalatable, but the tacit 
agreement demonstratedin these actions 
is that it does not matter what ideology 
one side or the other is using, as long as it 
is meant to achieve the same ends. 
The fact that Kenya and Somalia had 
a common arms supplier (the United 
States) and similar U.S. military bases on 
their soil did not disturb the Kenya- 
Ethiopia anti-Somalia alliance. To be 
sure, the U.S. did not support Somalia's 
border claims and quest for "Greater 
Somalia." The stated U.S. position was 
that provision of armaments to Somalia 
were "conditional upon a nonaggressive 
posture towards Kenya by Somalia." 
Tensions between Kenya and Somalia 
were thereby reduced.23 The strategic 
regional aspirations of the major players 
in the Cold War had superseded the 
aspirations of Somalis who were 
struggling for unification. As far as 
Kenya was concerned, Somalia's failed 
adventure in the Ogaden was a clear 
reminder of the determination of the 
regime in Muqdisho to realize its 
vaulting ambitions through whatever 
means, including infiltrating north- 
easternKenya. Convincedthat there was 
a real and potential threat there, the 
Kenyan government increased its 
coercive military presence in the area." 
While the growth of superpower 
involvement in the region (including in 
Egypt and the Sudan) from the 1970s 
until the demise of the Soviet Union may 
have been primarily attributable to the 
region's strategic position in relation to 
the oil-producing Middle East, client- 
states faced with enormous internal 
problems encouraged the superpowers 
toexpand their rolein the region. Writing 
in 1984, Peter Woodward pointed out 
that: 
Troubled client-states may expect help 
from their e x t m l  patrons to deal with 
political and economic difficulties: indeed, 
these may be presented in such a light as to 
actively encourage the involvement of the 
super-powers. Allegations that subversive 
activities in the domestic arena are being 
organised by  "communists and 
revolutionaries" on the one hand, or 
"feudalists and capitalist lockeys" on the 
other, quickly become the language of 
describing opposition threats, howarer far 
they may be removed from the rep1 
complexities of the political and economic 
problems faced by most states in the 
region." 
Although superpower involvement 
in local politics led to increased state 
repression, increased violations of 
human rights and increasing numbers of 
refugees, external support sustained the 
regimes of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, 
each of which were facing a crisis of 
legitimacy on the domestic front. 
In the 1980s border incidents and 
general insecurity in the North-Eastem 
Province provoked severe military 
retribution. Kenyan security forces 
responded with brutal military 
operations in the area, following an 
ambush in which a Kenyan government 
officer waskilledin June 1981. In another 
incident in early 1984, the army mas- 
sacred some 400 civilians.26 On February 
20, 1989 the Kenyan government 
reported that Somalia armed forces in- 
vaded the Sebule border area, wounded 
a number of Kenyans and killed six 
elephantsS2' In September 1989 the 
Kenyan government reported that four 
Kenyan policemen were killed, four 
other people were injured and some 
policemen were captured, following an 
attack on the small town of Garissa by 
Somalia armedf~rces.~~Kenya's security 
forces reacted to these incidents by using 
force totally out of proportion with the 
level of threat that the Somali dissidents 
posed to the security of the area. Violence 
was employed arbitrarily, unpredictably 
and brutally against people who were 
deemed "enemies" of the state. Perhaps 
the Kenyan government's strategy was 
to deter future disturbances in the area. 
By 1989 the political situation in 
Somalia was leading to civil war, social 
disintegration and the collapse of the 
state. In response, the Kenyan gov- 
ernment shifted its focus from "troubles 
Vwlence was employed 
arbitmdy, unpredictubly 
and brutally against people 
who were deemed "enemies" 
of the state. 
originating" from Somalia to its local 
poaching problem. The increasing 
incidence of poaching in Kenya's game 
parks, particularly in Tsavo, was now 
allegedly linked to the "agitators" in the 
North-Eastern Province. Indeed, the 
recent spate of poaching and killings in 
the area has been blamed on 
"indigenous" and "alien" Somalis. 
Ironically, while similar incidents in 
other parts of Kenya are treated as 
isolated cases of crime, in the North- 
Eastern Province or adjacent areas they 
are often treated as part of deliberate 
political and economic strategies to 
destabilize the nation and discourage 
tourism. The incident of September 5, 
1988, in which twelve travellers were 
killed and twenty-nine others injured 
when three buses were attacked between 
Gartuba and Bangale, is a case in point.29 
Accordingly, the government attempted 
to save its troubled tourist industry by 
appointing Dr. Richard Leakey to 
implement its nationwide shoot-to-kill 
policy against poachers. However, since 
24 Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) 
the government had presented Somalis 
as poachers, this policy was interpreted 
by some Kenyan-Somalis as an official 
strategy to legitimize the massacre of 
their p e o ~ l e . ~  
In November 1988 the MP for Dujis in 
Garissa District and Minister of State 
Hussein Maalim Mohammed, stated 
that aliens from a neighbouring country 
(Somalia) had infiltrated the country and 
were illegally acquiring citizenship and 
engaging in dubious business. In 1989 
the Kenyan government began 
screening ethnic Somalis in the country. 
The Weekly b i e w  (November 17,1989) 
made this observation: 
The current screening of ethnic Somalis in 
Kenya may, on the face of it, appear 
unusual, but those anxious for an 
explanation probably need not go much 
further than the deterioration in recent 
months of the security situation in North- 
Eastern Province and surrounding 
areas.... If the intention of the current 
screening exercise of ethnic Somalis is to 
root out rebels whom Barrecomplains have 
sought sanctuary in the county, then the 
Sornaligovemment has every reason to be 
pleased. As for local Somalis, some of them 
may find the exercise inconvenient, and 
probably even a discriminatory one. But 
thesecurityfactors involwdaWear to have 
led the Kenya government to decide that 
the movewas  imperative. Being a 
neighbourof Somalia andhavinga sireable 
ethnic Somali population within its 
borders, Kenya can barely escape some 
consequences of the internal strife in 
Somalia?' 
The image of Somalis seen in the 
larger historical context of conflicts 
between the two states and between the 
central government and the North- 
Eastern Province have blurred the 
distinction between Somali refugees and 
Kenyan-Somalis. As a matter of fact, the 
distinctionis often arbitrary, and this has 
affected the lives of all Somalis in Kenya. 
Africa Watch had this to say: 
State of emergency laws in the North 
Eastern Province allow security forces to 
detain anyone for up to 56 days without 
trial. An umbrella charge of "banditry" 
has been used ubiquitously in the North 
Eastern Province to subject a countless 
number of individuals to harassment, 
beatings, detention and torture as we21 as 
being levied dgainst entire village 
wmmunitiesasanofFcinlplatfwm tomrry 
out violent security sweeps. There have 
been a number of massacres by Kenyan 
security forces in the North Eastern 
Province condemnedas poss violations of 
human rights by the international 
organizations-in Garissa 1980, 
Modgashe 1982, Pokot 1984, Wajir 1984 
and Wajir 1987 .... In 1987 another 
incident in Wagnla, near Wajir, resultedin 
at least297peoplemassaned, although the 
government only acknozoledged 57 daad 
claiming "inter-triil clashes. " The killing 
followed a systematic operation by the 
securityf01ces who confiscated thousands 
of identity cards and closed all water 
sources in Wajir, a desert region. 
Eyewitness reports told of people forced to 
strip, detained in barbed wire enclosure 
and depn'wd of food and water. Groups of 
people were burnedalive with petrol; others 
were shot or beaten to death?2 
In its opposition to government 
repression of Kenyan-Somalis and the 
forcible repatriation of Somali refugees, 
A h  Watch argued that: 
The Kenyan authorities are also using the 
influx of Somalis seeking sanctuary to 
impose a discriminatory and repressive 
&eeningprocess on its &n ethnic Somali 
community, which has sujfereda history of 
persecution .... Some 3,000 refugees 
staying in makeshifl shelters in Liboi, 
North Eastern Kenya, received no food or 
assistance from the Kenyan authorities 
sincearrivhgin Kenyaon~eptember20 .... 
The refugees were harassed and beaten by 
Kenyan securityforces, and three arrested 
for "inciting resistance" against 
deportation. All refugees have now 
reportedly been returned to areas in 
Somalia where hea y fighting persists, or 
have fled to escape forcible repatriation .... 
The authorities have increased security 
sweeps and identity checks of Kenyans of 
Somalioriginand Somalis livingin Kenya. 
The arrival of the refugees is k ing  used as 
an opportunity to impose compulsory 
screening on all Kenyan-Somalis, in order 
to identify "illegal aliens." 33 
It is also imperative to indicate that 
the unstated- policy of "refugee 
deterrence," which often means 
discouraging refugee influx by forcing 
refugees to go to the overcrowded camps 
and/or inducing involuntary 
repatriation, affects the treatment of 
refugees in general. Sending refugees to 
overcrowded camps, however, also 
reflects the lack of resources available to 
provide needed assistance to refugees. 
As a matter of fact, the severe ecological, 
political and economic crises the country 
faces have direct implications for 
refugees in the country. With thousands 
of internally displaced persons (products 
of political or "ethnic" violence) and 
hundreds of thousands facing famine 
due to drought, the government of 
Kenya does not have the capacity to meet 
the basic human rights needs of an 
estimated 700,000 refugees now living 
within Kenya (most of whom are Somali 
refugees). 
The Kenyan government needs to 
radically change its inhumane treatment 
of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees. 
This will mean that the state should 
adhere tointernational humanrights and 
refugee covenants it endorsed. Also, it 
should develop a refugee determination 
mechanism that will make a clear 
distinction between Kenyan-Somalis 
and Somali refugees. Equally important, 
Kenya and other OAU member states 
must find a democratic way of 
addressing the question of the state's 
political legitimacy. The question of 
protecting and meeting minority ethnic 
groups' aspirations can no longer be 
avoided by Kenya and the OAU. There is 
an urgent need for the international 
community to address the crisis in 
Somalia to save the loss of human lives 
and allow for a speedy repatriation of 
Somali refugees. Assistance to refugees 
inKenyamaybe directed to the UNHCR, 
African Medical and Research 
Foundation, Mbdecins San Fronti$res, 
All-African Conference of Churches, 
Church of the Province of Kenya, 
National Council of Churches of Kenya/ 
Refugee Service Unit, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Kenya Red 
Cross Society, Jesuit Refugee Service in 
Africa and Kenya Catholic Secretariat. rn 
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